

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01472 01 OF 02 141743Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----141747Z 026410 /43

O P 141653Z MAR 77  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 928  
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 1472

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, PLO, EG, SY, JO, XF  
SUBJECT: KING'S REPORT ON CAIRO SUMMIT

REF: (A) STATE 048334, (B) STATE 053875

SUMMARY: DISCUSSED WITH KING THE SECRETARY'S AND RABIN'S VISIT TO THE AREA (REFTELS). KING TOLD ME THAT SADAT IN PRINCIPLE WAS IN SYMPATHY WITH UNIFIED ARAB DELEGATION APPROACH BUT WAS UNWILLING TO BE PERMANENTLY TIED TO ARAFAT (AND OTHERS) IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. ARAFAT TOLD KING HE WOULD NOT FAVOR LINKS BEFORE PEACE SETTLEMENT AND INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. SADAT SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO WORK ON ARAFAT SOME MORE. ARAFAT WANTS TO KEEP DIALOGUE OPEN AND WILL INSIST ON RECOGNITION OF PLO, A FULL SEAT AT NEGOTIATIONS, AND AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. KING HAS NO PLANS TO MEET ARAFAT IN JORDAN SOON AND TOLD ARAFAT THERE WERE SECURITY DANGERS TO HIS COMING HERE. ALSO NO PLANS TO RELEASE PALESTINIAN PRISONERS FROM JORDAN. KING PRIMARILY CONCERNED ABOUT LACK OF ARAB STRATEGIC PLANNING AND COHESIVE PLAN FOR  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 01472 01 OF 02 141743Z

THE PEACE SETTLEMENT. WANTS VERY MUCH TO MEET WITH PRINCE FAHD BEFORE THEIR VISITS TO THE US. FEELS SADAT SO COMPELLED BY NEED FOR SETTLEMENT THAT HE UNWILLING TO COORDINATE SERIOUSLY WITH OTHER ARABS. ASAD IS NORMALLY RELUCTANT TO DO MUCH IN THIS AREA. KING SAID SADAT PUSHED JORDAN TOWARD CLOSER RELATIONS WITH SYRIA WHICH MORE UNIFIED ENTITY THEN COULD ABSORB PALESTINIANS. KING

SAID HE PREFERS GO SLOW WITH ASAD AND SEE FIRST WHAT CAN BE WORKED OUT WITH PALESTINIANS. ALL ARAFAT WANTS TO DO IS TO KEEP OPEN THE DIALOGUE AT PRESENT. KING SEES LITTLE BEING ACCOMPLISHED BY PLO AT CURRENT MEETINGS, ALTHOUGH HE BELIEVES SADAT WILL ATTEMPT TO ASSERT SIGNIFICANT PRESSURE ON PLO. END SUMMARY.

1. WHEN I SAW KING MARCH 14, I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO REPORT TO HIM IN SOME DETAIL ON YOUR VISIT TO THE AREA (REFTEL A) AND RABIN'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON (REFTEL B). KING RECEIVED THESE REPORTS WITH INTEREST AND ALSO TOLD ME HE HAD READ OVER PRESIDENT'S MARCH 9 NEWS CONFERENCE WHICH HE SAID HE THOUGHT BROKE NEW GROUND VERY FAVORABLY. HE NOTED IN PASSING SADAT'S SOMEWHAT SOUR REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON MARCH 9. HE THOUGHT HE MIGHT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PART OF THIS BY HAVING TAXED SADAT HEAVILY IN CAIRO FOR OVER-OPTIMISM ABOUT A PEACE SETTLEMENT. CONNECTION WAS NOT ALL THAT CLEAR TO ME, BUT BEFORE I COULD FOLLOW UP KING WENT ON TO DISCUSS CAIRO CONFERENCE.

2. SADAT MEETINGS - KING SAW SADAT TWICE AND AGAIN AT AIRPORT ON DEPARTURE. SADAT SEEMED UNCERTAIN ABOUT A COORDINATED ARAB STRATEGY -- SOMETHING KING IS PUSHING FOR. SADAT SAID THAT A UNIFIED ARAB DELEGATION (WITH MAJORITY RULE AND TACIT MUTUAL RECOGNITION BY PLO AND ISRAEL) IS IN THEORY THE BEST APPROACH, BUT HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE TIED IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS TO FELLOWS LIKE ARAFAT. KING  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 AMMAN 01472 01 OF 02 141743Z

BELIEVES SADAT'S DRIVE FOR PEACE SETTLEMENT HAS INCREASED SINCE JANUARY. AS A RESULT OF RIOTS IN CAIRO, AN EFFORT TO FIND A SETTLEMENT THAT WILL RELEASE FUNDS TO DEVELOP EGYPTIAN ECONOMY IS MAJOR GOAL OF SADAT. SADAT WILL GO IT ALONE IF GENEVA BOGS DOWN; HIS DESIRE FOR PEACE TO ENSURE EGYPT'S ECONOMIC SURVIVAL IS SO STRONG. SADAT WANTS AS FEW FETTERS AS POSSIBLE ON HIS NEGOTIATING MANEUVERING ROOM. IF GENEVA AT LATER POINT GETS STALEMATED, KING SAYS, SADAT IS READY TO CUT LOSE AND SEE WHAT HE CAN DO HIMSELF.

3. SADAT WAS TOUGH ON PALESTINIANS. KING TOLD SADAT, CONTRARY TO LATTER'S ASSURANCES, THAT ARAFAT WAS NOT INTERESTED IN LINKS WITH JORDAN PRIOR TO PEACE. SADAT SAID "YOU LET ME TAKE CARE OF ARAFAT". SADAT ALSO INCENSED BY REPORT THAT BOUMEDIENNE HAD TOLD ARAFAT HE WAS OUT OF HIS MIND TO TURN OVER TO ADF THE PLO HEAVY WEAPONS IN THE BEIRUT REFUGEE CAMPS. SADAT SAID HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND SUCH FREE ADVICE AND

INFLUENCE IS OFFERED TO THE PLO FROM OTHER ARABS  
LIKE LIBYA, ALGERIA AND IRAQ.

4. ON THE ARAFAT MEETING, KING SAID HE BEGAN -- MORE  
IN SORRY THAN IN ANGER -- BY TELLING ARAFAT ABOUT HOW  
THE PLO HAD DESTROYED THE CASE OF THE PALESTINIANS  
OVER THE PAST SIX YEARS BY THEIR ACTIONS. ARAFAT  
HEARD HIM OUT AND APOLOGIZED. HE SAID THAT HE COULD  
UNDERSTAND WHY JORDAN AND LEBANON COULD NOT TRUST  
AND WOULD NOT TRUST PLO. PLO WAS DETERMINED HOWEVER  
TO BUILD RELATIONS WITH JORDAN AND JORDAN WOULD COME  
OVER TIME TO KNOW IT COULD TRUST PLO.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01472 02 OF 02 141800Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----141802Z 026615 /43

O P 141653Z MAR 77  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 929  
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 AMMAN 1472

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

5. ON UNITY STEPS, ARAFAT SAID JORDANIANS AND  
PALESTINIANS WERE ONE PEOPLE AND DID NOT NEED  
LINKS NOW. PLO WANTED RECOGNITION, A FULL SEAT AT  
THE TABLE, AND AN INDEPENDENT STATE. IT WOULD NOT  
DEAL FOR ANYTHING LESS. KING SAID THAT THIS WAS  
SO DIFFERENT FROM WHAT SADAT HAD SAID WAS ARAFAT'S VIEW THAT  
HE ASKED ARAFAT WHAT HE REALLY WANTED WITH JORDAN. PLO WANTS  
ONLY TO STAY IN TOUCH WITH JORDAN AND CONTINUE DIALOGUE.  
ARAFAT ASKED ABOUT A VISIT TO JORDAN AND KING SAID  
IN EFFECT THIS WOULD CAUSE HIM SERIOUS PROBLEMS AS  
MANY HAVE NOT YET FORGOTTEN 1970. NO DATE WAS SET  
AND KING SEEMS UNINCLINED TO DO SET ONE. KING SAYS HE  
HAS NO INTENTION OF RELEASING PALESTINIAN PRISONERS  
AND THERE HAS BEEN NO PUSH FOR THIS FROM PLO SINCE

JORDAN SHUT THEM OFF ON THIS POINT AT LAST AMMAN MEETINGS. THERE ARE ONLY A FEW KING SAID. AS FOR A FOUR-POWER SUMMIT IN DAMASCUS (EGYPT, SYRIA, JORDAN AND PLO) KING SAYS HE HAS NOT HEARD OF IT. PLO STILL WANTS TO OPEN MORE OFFICES IN JORDAN AND RESUME A MORE ACTIVIST ROLE HERE ON WHICH KING IS MOST NEGATIVE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 01472 02 OF 02 141800Z

6. KING SAID HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE LACK OF ARAB STRATEGIC PLANNING AND COHESION. HE MET PRINCE SAUD AND ASKED FOR A MEETING WITH FAHD BEFORE SAUDI CROWN PRINCE GOES TO US TO COORDINATE THEIR THINKING. SADAT SEEMS RUN MAD TO GET AN AGREEMENT AND UNWILLING TO TALK ABOUT OR AGREE ON STRATEGY. THE KING HAD HOPED FOR A TRIPARTITE STRATEGY SESSION IN CAIRO, BUT THERE WAS NO TIME. ASAD TRADITIONALLY HOLDS BACK FROM TAKING THE LEAD ON ANY KIND OF STRATEGY PLANNING AND WAS PREPARED TO LET EGYPT AND THE OTHERS GO TO THE FRONT IN MOVING AHEAD.

7. THE KING TALKED ABOUT HIS OWN POSITION. HE STILL FAVORS PLO ATTENDANCE AT GENEVA, BUT SEES NO REAL WAY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. SADAT WANTS PLO IN THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION, BUT CANNOT MAKE PLO BUY IT. THE KING OBJECTS TO GOING TO GENEVA WITHOUT SOME SETTLED MEANS OF HANDLING THE PALESTINIAN PART OF THE ISSUE. IF HE WERE TO GO WITHOUT THE PLO, HE SEES DANGERS IN MAKING CONCESSIONS AND THEN BEING FORCED TO GIVE THE TERRITORY TO THE PLO. HE DOES NOT THINK THE PRESENT PLO LEADERSHIP CAN NEGOTIATE AND HE DOES NOT SEE SADAT AND ASAD AS POWERFUL ENOUGH TO FORCE A REAL CHANGE IN THIS POSITION. I ASKED IF THE ARABS EXPECTED A US FORMULA TO BREAK THIS DEADLOCK. HE SAID NO. HE BELIEVED THE ARABS WERE NOT FAR ENOUGH ALONG IN THEIR THINKING TO KNOW WHAT THEY WANT AND THIS CONTINUED DRIFT WORRIED HIM.

8. ON THE CURRENT PLO MEETING IN CAIRO, HE SAID AGAIN THE DISARRAY IS LARGE AND SADAT IS LIKELY TO EXERT GREAT PRESSURE, BUT HE DID NOT EXPECT REAL CHANGES IN THE PLO NOW.

9. WHILE HE HAD NO DATE FIXED, HE SAID HE EXPECTED THE PLO TO WANT TO BEGIN ITS DIALOGUE WITH JORDAN. IN THIS CONNECTION, SADAT TOLD THE KING HE SHOULD MOVE QUICKLY TO WORK OUT HIS STATUS WITH

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 AMMAN 01472 02 OF 02 141800Z

SYRIA AND THEN BRING IN THE PLO. THE KING SAID HE IS MOVING AS FAST AS CIRCUMSTANCES ALLOW WITH SYRIA AND THAT JORDAN AND THE PALESTINAINS SHOULD WORK OUT THEIR RELATIONSHIP FIRST. THEN THEY COULD DEAL WITH THE SYRIANS AS A SINGLE UNIT. KING CLEARLY LEFT ME WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SYRIAN RELATIONSHIP WILL NOT BE HURRIED OR CARRIED TOO FAR.

10. COMMENT: KING SEEMS DISTURBED BY THE CONFUSION AND TURBULENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD. HE CLEARLY HOPES THE ARABS CAN DO MORE TO PLAN A JOINT STRATEGY AND RESOLVE ISSUES FOR THEMSELVES PARTICULARLY BEFORE HE GOES TO WASHINGTON. HE TALKED ABOUT PREPARING A JOINT PAPER, BUT DESPAIRED OF GETTING SADAT IN PARTICULAR TO AGREE. THIS PROBLEM IS THE MOST VEXING FOR HIM FOR THE MOMENT ESPECIALLY SINCE HIS OWN RELATIONSHIPS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS AND WITH THE PLO ARE BEING LEFT SO MUCH AT SEA.  
PICKERING

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, GOVERNMENT REACTIONS, SUMMIT MEETINGS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Sent Date:** 14-Mar-1977 12:00:00 am  
**Decaption Date:** 22 May 2009  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 22 May 2009  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1977AMMAN01472  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D770087-0284  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** AMMAN  
**Handling Restrictions:**  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1977/newtext/t19770364/aaaaceiz.tel  
**Line Count:** 244  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** 358824b9-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION SS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** 77 STATE 48334, 77 STATE 53875  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 17-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 3123323  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** KING'S REPORT ON CAIRO SUMMIT  
**TAGS:** PFOR, EG, SY, JO, XF, PLO, (HUSSEIN I)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/358824b9-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009